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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. $ 78-2a-3(j) (Supp. 1990). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the District Court correct when it ruled that 
Thiokol did not affirmatively represent that soil conditions at 
the Project Site would be the same as the conditions shown in the 
boring logs presented with the specifications where (a) all 
information provided was accurate; (b) the logs were accompanied 
by a map clearly showing they were obtained from another site 
over 1,400 feet from the Project Site; and (c) the logs were pre-
sented with a specific disclaimer that they were not a part of 
the contract and were provided for information only. 
2. Was the District Court correct when it ruled that 
Frontier did not reasonably rely on the boring logs as a repre-
sentation of conditions at the Project Site when (a) Frontier did 
not believe the boring logs were a representation that conditions 
at the Project Site would be identical to the subsurface condi-
tions indicated at the boring location; (b) Frontier knew that 
the logs were obtained from another site over 1,400 feet from the 
Project Site; (c) the boring logs were accompanied by a specific 
disclaimer; and (d) Frontier understood that the conditions it 
actually encountered were likely to be present in the vicinity of 
the Project Site. 
3, If Frontier is now attempting to appeal the dis-
missal of the defamation claim, is it entitled to do so when it 
did not raise that issue in its docketing statement? If so, did 
the District Court correctly grant Thiokol's motion for summary 
judgment on that issue where the communication was an opinion 
which was protected by the privilege between Thiokol and Layton 
and was made without malice. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing an appeal from an order granting or deny-
ing summary judgment, the Court of Appeals accords no deference 
to the trial court's legal conclusions but reviews them for cor-
rectness. CECO v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969 
(Utah 1989). The Court of Appeals construes the facts in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Lucky 
Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750 (Utah App. 1988). This 
is the standard applicable to issues one and two and the second 
part of issue three. In applying this standard, the appellate 
court will consider whether Frontier and Layton adduced suffi-
cient evidence to support as a matter of law the essential 
elements of their differing site conditions and defamation 
claims. See Reeves v. Geiqy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 
642 (Utah App. 1988); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986) (on summary 
judgment, the party opposing the motion has the burden of coming 
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forward with evidence in support of every essential element of 
its claim). 
The first part of issue three arises from Frontier/ 
Layton's failure to comply with the Utah Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure. It should be resolved in favor of Thiokol based on the 
application of that rule. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides in relevant part: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
Rule 9(c)(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
requires the docketing statement to include: 
The issues presented by the appeal, expressed in the 
terms and circumstances of the case, but without unnec-
essary detail . . . For each issue appellant must 
state the applicable standard of appellate review and 
cite supporting authority. 
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STATEMENT AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by Frontier and Layton (collectively 
"Frontier/Layton") from the order of the Honorable Franklin L. 
Gunnell of the First District Court for Box Elder County, State 
of Utah: 
1. Granting Thiokol's Motion for Summary Judgment; and 
2. Denying Frontier/Layton's Motion for Partial Sum-
mary Judgment. 
Frontier was a subcontractor to Layton on the Thiokol 
M-193 Trident Two Casting Complex (the "Project11). Thiokol owned 
the Project and Layton was the general contractor. Frontier 
sought additional compensation from Layton under the subcontract 
alleging that it encountered subsurface conditions different from 
those represented in the contract specifications. Layton denied 
liability to Frontier but nevertheless cross-claimed against 
Thiokol asserting that Thiokol is liable to Layton under the gen-
eral contract for any amount Layton is required to pay Frontier 
based on a differing site conditions claim. Frontier also 
asserted a defamation claim against Thiokol and Jody Wood, a 
Thiokol employee. 
Frontier subsequently settled with Layton and acquired 
Layton's claims against Thiokol. On cross motions for summary 
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judgment, the district court ruled in favor of Thiokol, dismiss-
ing the action in its entirety with prejudice. 
STATEMENT OP UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The following undisputed facts were presented to the 
court below on the issues now on appeal: 
1. Thiokol and Layton executed a Purchase 
Order/Contract ("Purchase Order") dated July 17, 1986 which 
included specifications ("Specifications") for the construction 
of the Project. (R. 472-479). 
2. The Purchase Order incorporates Thiokolfs standard 
terms for fixed price construction contracts, Form TC-7761 
("Standard Terms"), which in turn incorporates certain Federal 
Acquisition Regulations ("FAR") by reference. (R. 480-484). The 
Purchase Order, Specifications, Standard Terms and'FAR will be 
collectively referred to as the "General Contract." The relevant 
provisions of the Purchase Order, Specifications, Standard Terms, 
and FAR regulations are reproduced in full in Addendum "A." They 
may be summarized as follows: 
a. The terms of the General Contract are binding 
on all subcontractors as well as the general contractor. 
Purchase Order at 1117.0. (R. 478-479). 
b. A claim for differing site conditions arises 
only if conditions represented in the contract are materi-
ally different from conditions actually encountered or are 
unusual and cause an increase in the contractor's cost or 
time required for performance. FAR S 52.236-2(A). (R. 
543). 
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c. The contractor shall make every effort to 
familiarize himself with prevailing work conditions and is 
not relieved from responsibility for performing work without 
additional cost to Thiokol by his failure to do so. Speci-
fications, General Requirements at HI.11; FAR S 52.236-3. 
(R. 544). 
d. Prior to starting work, the contractor will 
become familiar with site conditions concerning excavation, 
filling and grading. Specifications, Excavation, Filling 
and Grading at 3.01(A). (R. 545). 
e. A copy of a log of soil borings from another 
building site over 1,400 feet away is included with the 
specifications. Specifications, Subsurface Investigations 
at 1.01(A), (B). (R. 545). 
f. The Specifications state explicitly that the 
boring logs are provided for the contractor's information 
only and are not a warrant of subsurface conditions. Speci-
fications at 1.01(C). (R. 545). 
g. Thiokol assumes no responsibility for the con-
tractor's conclusions or interpretations of the information 
provided by Thiokol. FAR S 52.236-3(D). (R. 544). 
h. The contractor is not relieved from performing 
details omitted from the specifications or drawings. Stan-
dard Terms at H16. (R. 543). 
3. On August 7, 1986, Frontier and Layton entered into 
a Subcontract Agreement pursuant to which Frontier agreed to per-
form part of the Shoring and other portions of the General Con-
tract at the fixed price of one hundred sixty thousand one hun-
dred dollars ($160,100.00). (R. 31-32). 
4. There was no contract between Thiokol and Frontier. 
(R. 279-297). 
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5. Jeong S. Liu ("Liu"), Vice President and Office 
Manager of Frontier, prepared Frontier's bid on the subcontract 
work on the Project. (R. 123, Liu Depo. I at 26). Liu has a 
B.S. degree in civil engineering, a masters degree in soil 
mechanics and a Ph.D. in structural engineering. (R. 123, Liu 
Depo. I at 34). The field of soil mechanics deals with the com-
position, density, grain size and mechanical properties of soil. 
(R. 123, Liu Depo. I at 15). 
6. Before bidding for the subcontract work on the 
Project, Frontier previously had worked on five other Thiokol 
projects in the Salt Lake Valley in Box Elder County west of 
Brigham City, including the M-191 site and M-301 buildings. (R. 
123, Liu Depo. I at 9-12, 17-19; R. 133, Liu Depo. II at 70). 
7. The Project is located in the northern part of the 
Salt Lake Valley near an old creek bed (the "Project Site"). (R. 
123, Liu Depo. I at 16-17, 20; R. 119, Larsen Depo. at 7). The 
majority of the soils in the Salt Lake Valley are lacusterine 
deposits, or deposits formed by an ancient lake. (R. 123, Liu 
Depo. I at 15-16, 39). Lacusterine deposits are composed of dif-
ferent sized particles from silt to gravel and boulders. (R. 
123, Liu Depo. I at 15-16, 39). Lacusterine deposits modified by 
alluvial deposits are typical near old creek beds. Alluvial 
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deposits are left by the force of flowing water and consist of 
sand, gravels, cobbles and clay. (R. 123, Liu Depo. I at 16). 
8. It is not unusual for subsurface soil conditions to 
change radically within a distance of 10 feet. (R. 125, McLean 
Depo. at 24). Soil conditions typically differ from location to 
location. (R. 123, Liu Depo. I at 18). 
9. The General Contract contained no indications of 
subsurface soil conditions at the Project Site. Although two 
boring logs were provided with the Specifications, those logs 
came from the M-191 site, 1400 feet south of the Project Site and 
the Specifications clearly identified that fact. Specifications 
at SS 02010, 02010/2. (R. 665-666).-7 
10. The same section of the Specifications which pre-
sented the boring logs contained this disclaimer: 
The soil report was obtained only for the engineer's 
use in the design and is not a part of the contract 
documents. The log of borings is provided for contrac-
tor's information but is not a warrant of subsurface 
conditions. 
11. Before bidding on the Project, Frontier's repre-
sentative knew the boring logs included in the Specifications 
were not taken from the Project Site, that the Project Site was 
close to an old creek bed, that gravels and cobbles were likely 
1/ Copies of the boring logs and map are attached to this Brief 
as Addendum "B." 
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in the soils found in the vicinity of the Project, particularly 
in areas near old creek beds, and that extensive cobbles and 
boulders were encountered at another nearby Thiokol site despite 
boring logs to the contrary, (R. 133, Liu Depo. II at 57, 71; R. 
123, Liu Depo. I at 19-20; R. 125, McLean Depo. at 27-28). 
12. Frontier did not interpret the boring logs as a 
representation that subsurface conditions at the Project Site 
would be identical to conditions at the site from which the logs 
were taken. (R.123, Liu Depo. I at 28). 
13. Frontier did not inspect the Project Site prior to 
the preparation of its bid. (R. 123, Liu Depo. I at 20). 
14. The Shoring portion of the General Contract 
2/ 
required Frontier to drive steel sheet piles into the earth.-
Frontier encountered difficulty driving the sheet piles immedi-
ately after starting work August 7, 1986. (R. 125, McLean Depo. 
2/ The Shoring portion of the General Contract provided for 
construction of two casting pits at either end of the Cast 
Cure Building. It required driving interlocked steel sheet 
piles about 49 feet into the earth to form two steel frames 
approximately 23'4" square. See Specifications at §02400 
(R. 546); see also photograph illustrating the pile-driving 
procedure. (R. 549). The earth was later excavated from 
the frame, bracing installed, and a concrete lining poured 
so that the end product was a square cement-lined hole in 
the ground with the pilings as the outside form for the con-
crete walls. See Specifications at S02400 (R. 546); see 
also photograph depicting the pile-lined enclosure after 
excavation and prior to pouring the cement lining. (R. 550). 
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at 36, 40). The piles were driving out of plumb and were dis-
torting and bending below the surface. (R. 125, McLean Depo. at 
40-41). 
15. Frontier encountered intermittent layers of gravel 
between 6 to 30 inches thick on some piles at varying depths. 
(R. 125, McLean Depo. at 82-83); see also photographs which show 
the gravel "lenses" encountered in various areas. (R. 551-555). 
16. Frontier now asserts that its problems with the 
pile driving were caused by "not being able to move around the 
gravels in the stiff clay zone." (R. 125, McLean Depo. at 78). 
17. On August 28, 1986, Frontier asserted that it had 
encountered differing site conditions. (R. 134, Exhibits to Liu 
Depo. I, at Exhibit 6). On August 29, 1986, Layton denied that 
there were differing site conditions and suggested that Fron-
tier's problems were due to its improper procedures and equip-
ment. (R. 123, Liu Depo. I at 55; R. 134, Liu Depo Exhibits at 
Exhibit 6(A)). 
18. Layton did not assert a differing site conditions 
claim against Thiokol until Frontier sued Layton. (R. 184, 
190-192). Subsequently, Layton and Frontier settled and Frontier 
acquired Layton1s claim against Thiokol. See Appellants Brief at 
5. 
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FACTS CONCERNING DEFAMATION ISSUE 
The defamation issue is not properly before this Court, 
Nevertheless, the undisputed facts relevant to that issue are as 
follows: 
19. On August 28, 1986, representatives of Thiokol, 
Layton and Frontier met at the Project Site in response to Fron-
tier's claim that it had run into gravels and cobbles. Jody Wood 
of Thiokol was present at that investigation and did not see cob-
bles or gravels in the drilling spoils he was shown during that 
visit. (R. 120, Wood Dep. at 45-48). 
20. On September 2, 1986, representatives of Thiokol, 
Layton and Frontier again met at and inspected the site. Gravel 
was found in the drilling spoils at that time. (R. 125, McLean 
Depo. at 68). 
21. No work was done at the site between the August 28 
and September 2 site inspections. (R. 125, McLean Depo. at 
65-66; R. 134, Liu Depo. Exhibits at Exhibit 28). 
22. In a letter to Layton dated September 9, 1986, 
Wood, who was responsible for administration of the General Con-
tract, stated "the fact that gravel suddenly appeared [during the 
second site inspection] would tend to conclude that the site may 
have been seeded." (R. 134, Liu Depo. Exhibits at Exhibits 19, 
i 
28; R. 120,^ Wood Depo. at 67-69; R. 468-470). 
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23. Jody Wood wrote the September 9 letter in response 
to Frontier's claim for additional compensation. (R. 468). When 
he wrote that letter, Wood sincerely believed it was possible 
that gravel had been added to the drilling spoils. (R. 469). 
Wood was acting to protect Thiokol's interest in avoiding 
non-meritorious claims for extra compensation and had no other 
explanation for the sudden appearance of the gravel when no work 
was done at the Project Site between the two investigations. (R. 
469-470). The letter was directed to Layton because Layton was 
responsible for Frontier's performance, and because Layton would 
have been the party to bring any claim against Thiokol for extra 
compensation. (R. 469-470). Wood bore no malice toward Fron-
tier. (R. 469-470). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The District Court correctly ruled that Thiokol did not 
make an affirmative representation of subsurface conditions at 
the Project Site. The presentation of accurate boring logs from 
a location over 1,400 feet from the Project Site, accompanied by 
a specific disclaimer that the logs were provided for information 
only and were not a warrant of subsurface conditions, is not such 
a representation. 
The District Court also ruled correctly that Frontier 
could not have reasonably relied on the boring logs as a 
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representation of subsurface soil conditions at the Project Site. 
Frontier knew that the logs were inherently unreliable as an 
indication of conditions at the Project Site. Frontier's repre-
sentative, Julian Liu, admitted that he did not rely on the logs 
as a representation that conditions would be identical at the 
Project Site. Liu had extensive education and experience with 
conditions in the Project area. The specific disclaimer accompa-
nying the logs warned Frontier not to rely on the logs as a war-
rant of conditions at the Project Site. 
Finally, if Frontier is now attempting to appeal the 
defamation issue, it waived that appeal by its failure to include 
the defamation claim in its docketing statement. Moreover, the 
District Court correctly granted Thiokol's motion with respect to 
the defamation claim because the statement in question was the 
expression of an opinion rather than a statement of fact. Fur-
thermore, it was a privileged communication based on a business 
relationship and no malice was shown. 
ARGUMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The General Contract between Layton and Thiokol con-
tains the differing site conditions clause incorporated from the 
Federal Acquisition Regulations. That clause allows a differing 
site conditions claim by appellants only if conditions 
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encountered were materially different from conditions represented 
in the General Contract (a,"FAR Type I" claim) or if conditions 
were "unusual," (a "FAR Type II" claim) and those conditions 
caused an increase in Frontier's costs or time for performance. 
Frontier/Layton assert only a Type I claim. 
Case law construing the differing site condition clause 
of FAR establishes six elements of a FAR Type I claim, each of 
which must be met by a claimant before recovery is permitted. 
Plaintiffs failed to present evidence of two essential elements 
in the district court sufficient to overcome Thiokol's motion for 
summary judgment. Thus, the summary judgment must be affirmed. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THIOKOL DID NOT 
MAKE AN AFFIRMATIVE REPRESENTATION OF SITE CONDITIONS. 
A. The Elements of a FAR Type I Claim Require The 
Contractor to Show An Affirmative Representation 
of Sub-Surface Conditions At The Project Site. 
The general contract between Thiokol and Layton incor-
porated Federal Acquisition Regulations, Sections 52:236-2 and 3. 
See Addendum "A." These provisions have never been interpreted 
by a Utah appellate court. They have been interpreted, however, 
by many federal court decisions. Those federal cases are the 
only guide, and therefore the best guide, as to the effect to be 
given to these provisions. 
In Weeks Dredging & Contracting, Inc. v U.S. 13 CI. Ct. 
193, 218 (1987), aff'd. 861, F.2d 728 (Fed. Cir. 1988), the U.S. 
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Claims Court considered a FAR Type I claim and laid out the ele-
ments necessary to establish such a .claim. They are: 
1. The contract documents must have affirmatively rep-
resented the subsurface conditions that form the basis of 
the contractor's claim; 
2. The contractor must have acted reasonably in inter-
preting the contract documents; 
3. The contract indications must have induced reason-
able reliance by the contractor that the subsurface condi-
tions were more favorable than those actually encountered; 
4. The subsurface conditions must have materially dif-
fered from the subsurface conditions indicated in the 
contract; 
5. The actual subsurface conditions must have been 
reasonably unforeseeable; and 
6. The contractor must show its claimed excess costs 
were solely attributable to the materially different subsur-
face conditions within the contract site. 
The claimant in Weeks contracted to dredge many miles of canal. 
The government furnished the contractor 156 boring logs, most of 
which were taken from the banks, rather than from the channel to 
be dredged. The claimant sought an adjustment because it claimed 
that the volume of particular types of materials actually encoun-
3/ tered exceeded the volume indicated by the boring logs.- As 
±' The contract documents indicated a gross volume of material 
to be dredged. Each boring log indicated types of materials 
and thickneses of each such material. The claimant argued 
that the compilation and (in effect) averaging of these 
material thicknesses was a representation of the total of 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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the Federal Circuit said in disposing of this claim, "the con-
tract did not affirmatively indicate the specific quantities of 
the various subsurface materials but only indicated the types of 
subsurface materials and the total volume of all materials to be 
removed." Weeks, Nos. 88-1044, 88-1070 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 2, 1988) 
(Westlaw, Allfeds Database). Thus, the first element of a dif-
fering site conditions claim, that the contract documents must 
affirmatively represent the subsurface conditions at the site, 
was not established. As long as the information supplied is 
accurate, the conclusions drawn by the contractor from that 
information are at his own risk. Weeks, 13 CI. Ct. at 221-223; 
see also, P.J. Maffei Bldq. Wrecking Corp. v. U.S., 732 F.2d 913 
(Fed. Cir. 1984). 
Similarly, Frontier/Layton failed to show that Thiokol 
supplied any inaccurate information or made any material repre-
sentation of subsurface conditions at the Project Site. All 
Frontier/Layton have shown is that Thiokol furnished what limited 
information it had, boring logs from another site over 1,400 feet 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
each of type of material that would be encountered at the 
site. As the Claims Court noted, this contention failed to 
take into account that many of the boring logs were from off 
the site. Additionally, the claimant failed to show that 
what was found at any given point could be expected to be 
found for any given distance around that point. 13 CI. Ct. 
at 221-223. 
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distant. Any conclusion drawn by appellants from that informa-
tion was at their own risk. "A contractor cannot be eligible for 
an equitable adjustment for changed conditions unless the con-
tract indicated what those conditions would supposedly be." 
Maffei, 732 F.2d at 916.-^ 
B. Thiokol's Specific Disclaimers Regarding Non-site 
Information Preclude the Finding of a 
Representat ion. 
An owner who specifically disclaims the accuracy of 
non-site information cannot be said to have made a representation 
of the site conditions. For example, in Maffei , the out-of-date 
structural drawings referred to in the specifications were cou-
pled with a disclaimer that the information was furnished "for 
information only," that it "not be part of the contract docu-
ments" and that it was "not guaranteed." Maffei, 732 F.2d at 
917. 
The undisputed facts presented to the trial court 
showed not only that Thiokol made no representations of condi-
tions at the Project Site, but that it warned that the non-site 
information provided should not be relied upon as a warrant of 
The elements under the Utah cases of Jack B. Parson Constr. 
Co. v. State, 725 P.2d 614 (Utah 1986) and Thorn Constr. Co. 
v. Dept. of Transp., 598 P.2d 365 (Utah 1979) are essen-
tially the same, and they include a requirement of a mis-
leading assertion of site conditions. 
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conditions at the Project Site. When Thiokol furnished the 
off-site boring logsf they were coupled with warnings and dis-
claimers (1) that the contractor had the duty of becoming famil-
iar with site conditions, (2) that the boring logs were from 
another site 1400 feet distant, (3) that they were not part of 
the contract documents, (4) that the logs were for information 
only, and (5) that they were not a warrant of subsurface 
conditions. 
The facts of this case bring it squarely within the 
holding of Maffei. See also, Wunderlich v. State. 423 P.2d 545 
(Cal. 1967). Frontier/Layton are precluded by the specific dis-
claimers in the Specifications from prevailing on their claim. 
Summary judgment for Thiokol was required by reason of these 
undisputed facts. 
C. Appellants' Argument That Thiokol Cannot Disclaim 
Fails to Take Into Account The Nature of Thiokol's 
Specific Disclaimer, 
Appellants urge that the disclaimers in the General 
Contract are ineffective. Appellants' Brief at 27. They fail to 
recognize a crucial distinction made by the case law between gen-
eral and specific disclaimers. 
Information provided by the owner vhat is non-specific 
to the contract site, accompanied by specific warnings or 
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disclaimers, will be enforced. In contrast, general disclaimers 
of site-specific representations will be disregarded. 
The first part of this rule is exemplified by Maffei. 
The second is illustrated by Hollerbach v. United States, 233 
U.S. 165, 34 S. Ct. 553, 58 L. Ed. 898 (1914), a case relied on 
by appellants. The distinction between the two parts of the rule 
is neatly explained in P.T. & L. Const, v. Dept. of Transp., 108 
N.J. 539, 531 A.2d 1330, 1335-42 (N.J. 1987). 
To sum up, when the State actually makes 
false representations in its contract documents 
that are more than gratuitous and amount to posi-
tive averments of site conditions, it will remain 
liable to the public contractor despite a general 
exculpatory clause in the contract. * * * Infer-
ential conclusions from contract documents, how-
ever, shall not be considered a false factual rep-
resentation in the face of sufficiently clear and 
unambiguous disclaimers of liability by the State. 
531 A.2d at 1342. Compare, Wunderlich v. State, 423 P.2d 545, 
548-50 (Cal. 1967) (court gave effect to the specific disclaimer 
where there was no positive assertion of site conditions), with 
E.H. Morrill Co. v. State, 428 P.2d 557 (Cal. 1967) (specific 
representation not overcome by a general disclaimer). 
This principle was recognized by the Utah Supreme Court 
in L.A. Young Sons Constr. Co. v. Tooele, 575 P.2d 1034 (Utah 
1978). The court in Young discussed Wunderlich extensively and 
adopted the Wunderlich rationale to deny the contractor recovery. 
In Youngf the paving contractor for an airport runway claimed it 
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had relied on information the owner had provided concerning soil 
conditions and the water table at the project site in calculating 
its bid. The contract contained a specific disclaimer concerning 
soil or material borings or tests. Id. at 1039. The court ruled 
that when there is no misrepresentation of the facts or withhold-
ing of material information and there is a disclaimer pertinent 
to the information presented, the contractor cannot justifiably 
rely on that information as a warranty of conditions. Id. at 
1038-39. 
The undisputed facts demonstrate that Thiokol made no 
site-specific representations, that the information it provided 
was general. Layton/Frontier were specifically warned not to 
rely on this information as a positive representation of site 
conditions. Thiokol's specific warning and specific disclaimers 
that were coupled with this general information precludes any 
argument that Thiokol made a representation of conditions at the 
Project Site. Maffei, Wunderlich, and Young, are all directly 
applicable. The district court's ruling that no representation 
of site conditions was made must be affirmed. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT FRONTIER DID 
NOT REASONABLY RELY ON THE BORING LOGS. 
As an independent basis for granting summary judgment, 
the district court found that Frontier/Layton could not demon-
strate that they reasonably relied on the boring logs. Under 
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Weeks, as well as the state law cases of Parson and Thorn, rea-
sonable reliance upon the alleged representation is an essential 
element of a differing site conditions claim. The undisputed 
facts of this case, however, including Frontier's admissions, 
preclude any showing that Frontier's reliance upon the boring 
logs was reasonable. 
To begin with, the contract documents specifically 
alerted Frontier that the boring logs were from a distant site by 
including a map showing the exact location of the other site in 
relation to the Project Site, along with the boring logs. In 
addition, the same section of the Specifications which presented 
the boring logs specifically stated that "the log of borings is 
provided for the contractors information but is not a warrant of 
subsurface conditions." These undisputed facts alone are suffi-
cient to support the trial court's ruling that Frontier could not 
have reasonably relied on the boring logs as an accurate repre-
sentation of conditions at the Project Site. 
The lower court's ruling is further reinforced by 
admissions that Frontier made in depositions. First, Frontier 
admitted that it knew before preparing its bid that the boring 
logs came from the distant site. In fact, Frontier had worked at 
the other site a few years earlier. Frontier knew that soil con-
ditions in the area of the Project site could change radically 
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within just a few feet. Frontier also was aware that because the 
Project was adjacent to a stream bed, the gravels, cobbles and, 
other conditions complained of were typical and could be expected 
to occur. Julian Liu's deposition testimony on that point was 
particularly illuminating: 
Q. I take it from what you say that where there 
have been streambeds, you might find a mixture of clays, 
sands and gravels? 
A. (Liu) Correct. 
(R. 123, Liu Depo. I. at 17). 
Q. Did you know that it [the Project] was adja-
cent to a creek bed? 
A. Yes, I do. 
(R. 123, Liu Depo. I at 20). 
Q. Mr. Liu, . . . given the location of Building 
M-193 [the Project], was it or was it not unusual to find 
gravel there? 
A. It was not unusual. 
(R. 123, Liu Depo. I at 21-22). 
In a "supplemental11 comment to that answer, Liu then 
stated: 
When you ask whether its unusual to run into 
gravels and cobbles, I answered yes in a sense 
that there's [a] creek there, there is hills sur-
rounding the site. Anybody with geotechnical 
training wouldn't say no, you will not run into 
gravels and cobbles. 
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(R. 123, Liu Depo. I at 22-23). 
Frontier's most damaging admissions undermine the very 
theory of its case. For example, Peter McLean of Frontier admit-
ted he knew that the boring logs were inherently unreliable as an 
indication of conditions at the Project Site because they were 
taken from another site 1400 feet distant: 
Q. And so when Irv Perkins pointed it out to you, 
you realized then, I take it, that the soil boring was over 
a thousand feet from this job? 
A. Exactly. 
Q. And I think earlier you testified that soil 
can change radically within even 10 feet; is that right? 
A. Exactly. 
Q. And so you then realized when you were told 
where the boring was that you didn't know what the soil con-
ditions were at the job site itself; is that correct? 
A. Soils vary so much that, yeah, it could be — 
it could be different at that point. It could be surmising 
things and working what you see, you're working blind; so 
therefore you surmise other problems when you're in soils if 
you don't have a recollection of the soils that's right then 
and there, you know, in that zone area. 
Q. Are you saying that you shouldn't rely on a 
soils report unless it's at the very location where you're 
going to be doing the pile driving? 
A. Yes, I'd say that. 
(R. 125, McLean Depo. at 27-28). 
Even more damaging was Julian Liu's admission that 
Frontier did not interpret the logs as a representation that 
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conditions at the Project Site would be identical to conditions 
at the site from which the borings were taken: 
Q. (By Mr. Patten) Now, Mr. Liu, is it your 
claim in this lawsuit that Morton-Thiokol or Layton repre-
sented to you that the soils at M-193 (the Project Site) 
would be identical to the soils in the borings taken over a 
thousand feet away? 
A. We bid our job according to the information, 
the soil boring logs, M-191 (the other site). There's no 
further information furnished to us; therefore, we based our 
claim on that. Also, the engineer has based his design on 
that; otherwise, he wouldn't have chosen the sheet pile 
scheme. 
Q. Now I want you to answer my question, and my 
question is do you claim that Morton-Thiokol or Layton rep-
resented to you that the soil borings of a location over a 
thousand feet away would be identical to M-193 (the Project . 
Site)? 
A. No. 
(parentheticals added) (R. 123, Liu Depo. I at 27-28). 
Ample authority exists for entering summary judgment on 
the issue of reasonable reliance, given the undisputed facts of 
this case and the nature of Frontier's admissions. For example, 
Pacific Alaska Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 436 F.2d 461, 
469 (Ct. CI. 1971) demonstrates that if contract documents do not 
indicate conditions at the site, a contractor cannot reasonably 
rely upon the contract documents as a representation of site con-
ditions. In that case, the contractor claimed to have inter-
preted the contract documents as indicating that no additional 
fill would be required for an embankment (i.e. that the job would 
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be "balanced"). In granting summary judgment to the government, 
the court determined that the contract documents were silent on 
that question and that the contractor's interpretations "are more 
realistically seen as hopes, expectations, guesses, or sugges-
tions than as firm indications that subsurface or latent condi-
tions were such that balance would actually be achieved." 436 
F.2d at 470. 
While not controlling, the Utah Supreme Courtfs deci-
sion in Young, 575 P.2d at 1038-1039, establishes a similar 
point". The Utah court held that a contractor could not justifi-
ably rely on non-specific information as a warranty of site con-
ditions in the face of a specific disclaimer coupled to the 
information presented. On a similar note, Weeks, 13 CI. Ct. at 
225, recognizes that the farther away the borings are from the 
contract site, the longer the extrapolations, and the greater the 
likelihood of inaccurate predictions. 
In the present case, Frontier unjustifiably assumed 
that it could rely on the boring logs from the M-191 site as an 
accurate depiction of subsurface conditions at the Project Site. 
The contract documents warned against such an inference. Fron-
tier knew better than to place such reliance on the logs. Never-
theless, Frontier turned a blind eye to the contract documents 
and to its own extensive knowledge of local soil conditions. It 
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now tries to pass to Thiokol the blame for the consequences of 
its own unreasonable actions. However, the legal authorities and 
sound policy are squarely contrary to Frontier's arguments. 
Thiokol was entitled to summary judgment below and that judgment 
should be affirmed. 
IV. FRONTIER/LAYTONfS FAILURE TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE OF TWO 
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THEIR CLAIM ENTITLES THIOKOL TO 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
On summary judgment, Frontier/Layton had the burden of 
coming forward with evidence in support of every contested ele-
ment of that claim. Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 
P.2d 636, 642 (Utah App. 1988); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317, 91 L.Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986); see also Weeks 
Dredging & Contracting, Inc. v. U.S., 13 CI. Ct. 193, 218 (1987), 
aff'd. 861 F.2d 728 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In the court below, appel-
lants produced no evidence to support their burden of proof on 
two of those necessary elements — (1) that Thiokol made a repre-
sentation about conditions at the Project Site and (2) that 
Frontier/Layton reasonably relied upon what information Thiokol 
did furnish. 
Frontier/Layton's failure to present evidence to sup-
port the representation and reliance elements is faial to their 
claim. Accordingly, the lower court's ruling granting summary 
judgment in favor of Thiokol must be affirmed. 
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V. THIOKOL AND JODY WOOD ARE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON FRONTIER'S DEFAMATION CLAIM. 
A. Frontier Has Waived its Right to Appeal the 
District Court Ruling on Frontier's Defamation 
Claim. 
Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
requires appellants' docketing statement to state: 
The issues presented by the appeal, expressed in the 
terms and circumstances of the case, but without unnec-
essary detail . . . For each issue appellant must 
state the applicable standard of appellate review and 
cite supporting authority. 
Appellant's docketing statement dated as of February 6, 1990 does 
not list the defamation issue. There is absolutely no indication 
in the docketing statement that Frontier/Layton intended to 
5/ 
appeal the court's ruling on Frontier's defamation claim.-
Their failure to even mention that claim in the docketing state-
ment precludes the assertion of the defamation claim on appeal. 
B. The District Court Ruling Granting Summary 
Judgment on the Defamation Claim Must Be Affirmed. 
In any event, summary judgment on the defamation claim 
in favor of Thiokol must be affirmed. The undisputed facts dem-
onstrate no defamatory statement was made, or alternatively, that 
Thiokol was privileged to make the statement. 
£/ Similarly, appellants did not refer to the defamation claim 
in their Motion for Summary Disposition filed February 15, 
1990 pursuant to Rule 10. 
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The allegedly defamatory material was in a September 9, 
1986, letter from Jody Wood of Thiokol to Layton. (R. 123, Liu 
Depo. I at 86, 121). In that letter, Wood wrote: 
The fact that gravel suddenly appeared would 
tend to conclude that the site may have been 
seeded. 
This communication does not meet the first element of a defama-
tion claim—a false and defamatory statement concerning another. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 559 (1977); Berry v. Moench, 8 
Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814, 820 (1958). It was not a defamatory 
statement, but Wood's opinion given to explain the sudden appear-
ance of gravel in the spoils at the Project Site. See, Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts S 556 (1977); see also Oqden Bus Lines v. 
KLS, Inc.. 551 P.2d 222, 225 (1976) (right of media to voice 
opinion). The communication was based solely on the fact that 
McLean was unable to produce any gravels when Wood inspected the 
Project on August 28, yet when the site was inspected on Septem-
ber 2, there was gravel found in the spoils even though no work 
had been done in the interim between the inspections. 
Whether a statement constitutes fact or opinion is a 
question of law, not a question of fact as urged by 
Frontier/Layton. Held v. Pokornyy 583 F. Supp. 1038, 1039 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). The words used were cast as an opinion by Wood. 
He said, "the fact . . . would tend to conclude." As an 
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expression of Wood's opinion, the defamation claim fails as a 
matter of law under the Celotex standard. 
In addition, Wood's statement was privileged. The ele-
ments of a conditional privilege have been enumerated by the Utah 
Supreme Court as "good faith, an interest to be upheld, a state-
ment limited in its scope to this purpose, a proper occasion, and 
publication in a proper manner and to proper parties only." 
Knight v. Patterson, 20 Utah 2d 242, 436 P.2d 801, 802 (1968); 
Sowell v. IML Freight, 30 Utah 2d 446; 519 P.2d 884, 885 (1974). 
Communications between persons who share a common business inter-
est are entitled to a qualified privilege and are not "libelous 
in the absence of malice." Lind v. Lynch, 665 P.2d 1276, 1278 
(Utah 1983). 
Thiokol and Layton share a common business interest. 
At the time Wood's letter was written, Frontier claimed it was 
having difficulty because of subsurface gravel even though no 
gravel had been shown on the initial inspection. Thiokol and 
Layton were assessing the legitimacy of that claim which threat-
ened both Thiokol's and Layton's pecuniary interests. Wood's 
communication was limited to this purpose and was published only 
to Layton, which at the time shared Thiokol's purpose. 
Privilege makes the publication non-actionable unless 
the privilege is abused or malice proved. Knight, 436 P.2d at 
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803. The record contains no evidence of malice. Since Frontier 
has the burden of affirmatively showing malice when the condi-
tional privilege exists, the defamation claim fails as a matter 
of law. Knight, 436 P.2d 803 n.2; see also Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 91 L.Ed 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986) 
(plaintiff's burden is to submit significant probative evidence 
to support a reasonable jury finding that plaintiff has shown 
actual malice by clear and convincing evidence). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Thiokol respectfully submits 
that the ruling of the First District Court granting summary 
judgment in favor of Thiokol must be affirmed. Thiokol did not 
make an affirmative representation of subsurface conditions at 
the Project Site by presentation of accurate information about 
boring logs from another site accompanied by a specific dis-
claimer. Moreover, Frontier could not and did not reasonably 
rely on the boring logs as a representation that conditions at 
the Project Site would be identical to the conditions indicated 
at the boring location. Appellants are precluded from appealing 
the defamation claim by their failure to include it in the dock-
eting statement, and cannot prevail on that claim since Wood's 
communication was his opinion given in a privileged context and 
without malice. 
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1.0 All work under this contact shall be completed in 
strict accordance with Morton Thiokol specifications 
137-86, Addendums 1, 2, 3, and all drawings as called 
out in the Specifications and Addendums. 
4.0 For and in consideration of the satisfactory 
performance of this contract, Morton Thiokol shall pay 
the contractor the total sum of two million eight 
hundred and sixty-two thousand dollars ($2,862,000.00). 
8.0 No "Cost Bearing" changes in either the specifications 
or the drawings, including deletions or additions, 
shall be made without prior approval of the Morton 
Thiokol resident engineer and Morton Thiokol Buyer. 
Approval must be obtained in writing. In case of "Cost 
Bearing" changes, contractor will be required to 
furnish complete cost breakdown information. 
14.0 Morton Thiokol terms and conditions for fixed price 
construction contracts, Form TC 7761 (Rev. 5-86) and TC 
Form 7798 (Rev. 5-86) are incorporated herein by 
reference and shall apply to this contract as though 
fully set forth herein. 
17.0 The provisions of this contract shall be binding on all 
subcontractors as well as the contractor. It is the 
contractor's responsibility to inform subcontractors of 
the contract provisions. 
STANDARD TERMS. FORM TC 7761: 
Form TC 7761 is incorporated into the General Contract by 11 14.0 
as noted above and provides in relevant part: 
16. Scope of Work. Omissions from the drawings 
or specifications, or the misdescription of details of 
work which are manifestly necessary to carry out the 
intent of the drawings or specifications, or which are 
customarily performed, shall not relieve the Contractor 
from performing such omitted or misdescribed details of 
work, but they shall be performed as if fully and 
clearly set forth and described in the drawings and 
specifications. Such omitted or misdescribed work 
supplied by the Contractor shall be without cost to 
Morton Thiokol, but any changes in drawings or 
specifications directed by Morton Thiokol shall be made 
in accordance with the clause hereof entitled 
"Changes." 
FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION PROVISIONS: 
Form TC 7761 in turn incorporates certain clauses of the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation ("FAR") including 52.236-2 and 3 which 
provide as follows: 
Section 52.236-2 
Differing Site Conditions (Apr. 1984) 
A. The contractor shall promptly, and before the 
conditions are disturbed, give a written notice to [Thiokol] 
of: 
1. subsurface or latent physical conditions 
at the site which differ materially from those 
indicated in this contract, or 
2. unknown physical conditions at the site, 
of any unusual nature, which differ materially 
from those ordinarily encountered and generally 
recognized as inhering in the work of the 
character provided for in the contract. 
B. [Thiokol] shall investigate the site conditions 
promptly after receiving the notice. If the conditions do 
(materially so differ) and cause an increase or decrease in 
the contractor's cost of, or the time required for, 
performing any part of the work under this contract, whether 
or not changed as a result of the conditions, an equitable 
adjustment shall be made under this clause and the contract 
modified in writing accordingly. 
C. No request by the contractor for an equitable 
adjustment to the contract under this clause shall be 
allowed, unless the contractor has given the written notice 
required; provided, that the time prescribed in A. above for 
giving written notice may be extended by [Thiokol]. 
D. No request by the contractor for an equitable 
adjustment to the contract for differing site conditions 
shall be allowed if made after final payment under this 
contract. 
Section 52.236-3 Site 
Investigations and Conditions Affecting the Work (Apr. 1984). 
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. . . The contractor . . . acknowledges that it has 
satisfied itself as to the character, quality, and quantity 
of surface and subsurface materials or obstacles to be 
encountered from an inspection of the site, including all 
exploratory work done by [Thiokol] as well as from the 
drawings and specifications made a part of this contract. 
Any failure of the contractor to take the actions described 
and acknowledged in this paragraph will not relieve the 
contractor from responsibility for estimating properly the 
difficulty and cost of successfully performing the work, or 
for proceeding to successfully perform the work without 
additional expense to [Thiokol]. 
D. [Thiokol] assumes no responsibility for any 
conclusions or interpretations made by the contractor based 
on the information made available by [Thiokol]. Nor does 
[Thiokol] assume responsibility for any understanding 
reached or representation made concerning conditions which 
can affect the work by any of its officers or agents before 
the execution of this contract, unless that understanding or 
representation is expressly stated in this contract. 
RELEVANT SPECIFICATIONS; 
The specifications are incorporated into the General Contract by 
11.0 as noted above and include the following material 
provisions: 
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS 
1.11 SITE INSPECTION 
The Contractor shall make every effort to 
familiarize himself with the prevailing work 
conditions. Any failure by the contractor to do so 
shall not relieve him from the responsibility of 




A. Soil borings of the representative area 
near the building site have been taken by Chen and 
Associates, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
B. A copy of the boring logs is included.!/ 
1/ Copies of this section of the Specifications, the map and 
the boring logs are attached to this Brief as Addendum "B." 
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C. The soil report was obtained only for the 
engineer's use in the design and is not a part of the 
contract documents. The log of borings is provided for 
contractor's information but is not a warrant of 
subsurface conditions. 
EXCAVATION, FILLING, AND GRADING 
3.01 General 
A. Familiarization: Prior to all work of 
this section, the Contractor will become thoroughly 
familiar with the site, the site conditions, and all 
portions of the work falling within this [Excavations, 
Filling and Grading] section. 
SECTION 02400 
SHORING 
1.02 Description of Work 
B. Shoring and bracing shall be provided for 
the construction of the casting pits, with sheet piling 
to remain as the back form for the concrete pit walls. 
1.04 Qualifications 
Shoring operations shall be performed by a 
firm with experience in pile driving on similar 
completed projects. 
2.01 Shapes 
A. Steel sheet piles and special fabricated 
shapes shall be of a design that assures continuous 
interlock throughout the entire length when in place. 
3.01 Shoring and Bracing 
. . . 
C. Interlocking steel sheet piling, driven 
prior to the excavation effort, shall be used to shore 
the casting pits. Piling shall be driven to such 







PART 1 - GENERAL 
1.01 DESCRIPTION 
A. Soil borings of a representative area near the building site 
have been taken by Chen & Associates, Salt Lake City, UT. 
B. A copy of the boring logs is included. 
C. The soils report was obtained only for the Engineers use in 
the design and is not a part of the Contract Documents. The 
log of borings is provided for Contractors1 information but is 
not a warrant of subsurface conditions. 
1.02 QUALITY ASSURANCE 
A Soil Engineer may be obtained by Morton Thiokol to observe 
performance of work in connection with excavating, filling, and 
grading. Readjust all work performed that does not meet technical 
or design requirements but make no deviations from the Contract 
Documents without specific and written approval of the Engineer. 
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s e a t o dark t r t r . g e y
Clsy end s i l t , , atllfehtly sandy t o sandy, <CL-KL), l n t e r l a y e r e d , 
s t i f f t o very s t i f f , s l i g h t l y s o i e t t o very s o i e t , l i g h t t o dark D 
P Qndlstssbed Drive fieapl*. The syabo l 10/12 i n d i c a t e s tha t 10 bloi of s 1*»0 pound heaver f a l l i n g 30 i n c h e s v e r s required t o dr ive tl 
saap ler 12 i n c h e s . 
NOTES: 
t D Test holes were drilled on January 20, 1982, with a 7-inch dlanet 
hellow steal auger. 
(2) Elevetions ere approximate and were taken froa contours on plan 
provided. 
(5) No free water was encountered in the test holes at the tise of 
drilling. 
(4) WC - Water Content (*)t 
DD • Dry Deneity (pcf); 
-200 «= Percent Passing No. 200 Sieve; 
LL « Uquid Unit (*); 
PI • Plesticity Index (*); 
QC * Ohconfined Coapressive Strength (psf). 
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